

more depth. As political science, the book is a good case study of Congress, one of the few in the foreign policy area that focuses exclusively on Congress' abilities to oversee, and from the perspective of a staff member who appreciates and reports both the glamour and day-to-day work of politics.

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UNITED STATES

Foreign Policy and National Security

Haley, P. Edward, David M. Keithly, and Jack Merritt, eds.

Nuclear Strategy, Arms Control, and the Future

Boulder, CO: Westview Press
372 pp., \$37.50, ISBN 0-8133-0169-6
Publication Date: October 1985

Edward Haley is a political scientist, and Jack Merritt a physicist who, assisted by David Keithly, have been associated in teaching a course on "Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control" at Claremont McKenna College. Their text assembles fifty-eight "classic statements" on nuclear strategy and arms control made over the past forty years, primarily by American and Soviet policy makers and military thinkers. The first of the documents is a National Security Council 1948 paper defining U.S. policy on atomic weapons (NSC-30), and the last two, the late-1984 American and Soviet positions on strategic arms control. About one quarter of the entries present analyses by academic and other commentators, including the Pipes-Garthoff debate on Soviet strategy and the Drell-Panofsky critique of the Strategic Defense Initiative.

The statements brought together in this volume (often in extracts) present "declaratory" rather than "action" policy. They demonstrate the evolution of strategic concepts in roughly chronological sequence, from the earlier era of "plenty," to the more recent years of "parity and vulnerability." They document the arms control debate since the 1960s and include several selections on the "morality" of nuclear weapons. A leading theme, very well brought out, is the contrast between the "deterrence" ("stability" through "assured destruction") and the "warfighting" (or "victory is possible") schools of nuclear strategy. While the latter is the characteristic Soviet position, the former has lately been experiencing some erosion even though it has long been the classic U.S. position.

As compared with some other recent compilations on the nuclear theme the strength of this book is conceptual clarity and that should make it useful in a classroom context.

The basic concepts of the nuclear debate, as they emerge from official positions, and the commentaries upon them are presented with economy and skill. This clarity is achieved, though, at the expense of attention to "action policy" and to the political context. For example, the first war-use of weapons, in 1945, and the arms control talks it generated are unremarked. The important questions of whether deterrence has actually worked and do we owe the general peace since 1945 to nuclear weapons are not addressed. Discussions of the "Future" (prominent in the title) are couched predominantly in technical terms (e.g., those of reducing the numbers of weapons) even though it is obvious that "in the long run, the primary thrust for relieving the situation must be political" (p. 314). Political scientists need to pay more attention to the political tools for relieving this situation.

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Oseth, John M.

Regulating U.S. Intelligence Operations: A Study in Definition of the National Interest

Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky
236 pp., \$24.00, ISBN 0-8131-1534-5
Publication Date: May 1985

Despite the extensive public attention that focused on the foreign and domestic activities of American intelligence agencies during the 1974-1984 period, "no one has attempted a comprehensive, longitudinal analysis of the regulatory responses to the control and oversight issues raised in the last decade," John Oseth says in explaining this book's purpose. Oseth, an army intelligence officer and fellow at Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies, began the book as his dissertation at Columbia University "to explore the key ideas that shaped the intelligence debate and to survey the main regulatory themes" that emerged from it.

Three central questions give focus to the book. (1) What did the process of decision about intelligence controls look like: Who were the major actors, and what did they do? (2) What were the main concerns of those who participated? (3) What were the choices made and what do they say about our nation and its larger purposes? Those questions lead Oseth into a useful and detailed historical narrative of the regulatory issues that arose during that decade.

Oseth concentrates on issues concerning the Central Intelligence Agency; he makes no reference to important recent books on the National Security Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and unfortunately is unfamiliar with James Q. Wilson's

insightful 1978 study, *The Investigators: Managing FBI and Narcotics Agents*. Oseth's study of the CIA-related controversies, however, enables him to offer several valuable analytical insights.

Four principal contending themes emerged from the intelligence regulation debate, Oseth says: an insistence by some participants that America's national security interests were the weightiest consideration, an argument by others that protecting citizens from government excesses was the top priority, an emphasis that basic American norms of fairness and propriety must control government's foreign activities as well as domestic conduct, and a preoccupation with creating formal, legal constraints that would involve all three federal branches in controlling intelligence activities.

Oseth finds the intellectual clarity of that debate unsatisfactory: "in the public domain there is still no clear, unified vision of intelligence purposes to broaden and integrate thinking about these issues, no comprehensive set of principles outlining how intelligence operations serve central national values." In particular, Oseth is disappointed with the debate's excessive preoccupation with legal formalism: "the fundamental problem in controlling intelligence operations is not simply the lack of rules . . . it is, additionally, the caliber of people involved and the nature of the views about America and the world that they hold. A prescription for remedial or preventive action, then, must attend to the recruitment into government . . . of persons conscious of and committed to the full range of values and public purposes our government is constituted to serve and uphold." As other intelligence scholars have pointed out, that prescription often has been left unfilled. Oseth's contribution to improved discussion of these issues is a solid and valuable one.

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Smith, Merritt Roe, ed. Military Enterprise and Technological Change

Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press
391 pp., \$30.00, ISBN 0-262-19239
Publication Date: September 1985

Merritt Roe Smith, professor of history of technology at MIT, has compiled a collection of absorbing essays which deal with the technological advances in warcraft and the ways in which they were integrated into the military enterprise and the civilian economy. As this nation continues the debate about the costly and dramatically threatening or reassuring Strategic Defense Initia-