

struggle. Edwina Moreton's chapter, "Untying the Nuclear Knot" focuses on arms control and emphasizes SALT I and II and the START talks. While Moreton is clearly an advocate of arms control, she is critical of such simple solutions to the problem as a nuclear freeze. The book deals exclusively with strategic and tactical nuclear weapons policy between the Soviet Union and the United States. Hence such problems as weapons proliferation and regional nuclear powers such as China and Israel are either not touched upon or mentioned in passing.

While the authors purport to offer a middle ground between the two extremes in the nuclear weapons debate, their bias is dovish. In general the book is well written, objective, and dispassionate which makes it one of the better books to be published on the subject this year. All of the authors are British and all of them have published extensively in the field of east-west relations and nuclear strategy. Most likely, the book will be appealing to a professional audience. It could also be useful in graduate seminars.

ANDREW C. TUTTLE
University of Nevada, Las Vegas

Ball, Nicole and Milton Leitenberg
The Structure of the Defense Industry: An International Survey

New York, NY: St. Martin's Press
372 pp., \$27.50, LC 82-42565
Publication Date: July 1983

Ball and Leitenberg, both visiting research associates at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, introduce this volume of ten edited papers by explaining that the book's purpose is to "examine the role of defense industries in the industrial and economic structure of modern states." Individual essays by different specialists discuss military production and procurement in nine particular countries—the United States, the USSR, France, West Germany, Sweden, Czechoslovakia, Italy, China, and Israel—and an excellent tenth paper by Germany's Herbert Wulf surveys the limited amount of arms production in less developed countries.

Mainly of interest to specialists, this volume presents extensive descriptions of the defense industries in these respective countries, but devotes surprisingly little attention or analysis to the politics of arms procurement, either in individual nations or in comparative perspective. The editors declare that their own first goal is to "help define the degree to which institutional factors play a role in the armament of states," and explain that this is "a group of considerations which has been almost totally neglected in previous systematic research on

weapons acquisition." The underlying reason for the volume's emphases and weaknesses is perhaps best revealed in a separate introduction by economist Frank Blackaby, who acknowledges that "our knowledge of this industrial sector is still patchy—indeed in some ways fragmentary."

That lack of knowledge is especially acute with regard to those nations which can shield their defense industries from public inquiry—the Soviet Union, China, and Czechoslovakia—but to a lesser extent it plagues each of the individual essays, particularly with regard to the transnational aspects of the arms industry and the important but shadowy roles played by international armament traders.

The volume's most pronounced policy interest is the editors' desire to show that substantial international disarmament would not result in widespread economic havoc because of the resulting decline in arms production. "Reductions would cause relatively minor economic dislocations in nearly all cases," Ball and Leitenberg assert. "The common assumption," Blackaby adds, "that there is a formidable economic problem involved" in any major disarmament, is an erroneous one. "Conversion of defence industries would . . . be quite manageable," and "disarmament would add only a small additional fraction to the amount of industrial change occurring in any case," he contends. These conclusions are supported by the findings of some of the individual essays, such as Judith Reppy's paper on the United States, but are openly contradicted by other chapters, such as Edward Kolodziej's contribution on France and Gerald Steinberg's on Israel. While such a problem is distressingly common in edited works, it is but one of the shortcomings of this useful but limited volume.

DAVID J. GARROW
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

Connelly, Robert H. and Demetrios Caraley, eds.
National Security and Nuclear Strategy
New York, NY: The Academy of Political Science
186 pp., \$7.95, LC 83-071436
Publication Date: August 1983

This book is a collection of articles that have recently appeared in *Political Science Quarterly* or the *Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science*. Despite the collection's title, only four of the thirteen chapters focus on nuclear strategy, and as a result there is no discernible central theme in the book. Among the topics are American policy in the United Nations, the current state of the UN "peacekeeping" func-

tion, strategic military intelligence, just war doctrine, Soviet activities in Southern Africa and Eastern Europe, and others. The most interesting of the non-strategic articles is Inis Claude's discussion of the evolution of just war doctrines from the medieval period to its reemergence today. Though the quality of most of the essays is good, the diversity of topics makes it difficult to know to which audience the book is addressed, though professional political scientists with some general interest in international politics may find it useful.

The four articles dealing with nuclear matters are presumably the heart of the collection. Paul Nitze sounds his familiar alarms about Soviet expansionism and military strength, adding little to what he and many others have published numerous times. Samuel F. Wells, Jr. examines the massive retaliation policy of the Eisenhower administration, arguing that despite the rhetoric, indiscriminate nuclear retaliation against cities was never Eisenhower's operational policy. On a similar topic, Barry M. Blechman and Robert Powell examine the Eisenhower administration's threat to escalate the Korean War, probably to the nuclear level, in order to induce the Chinese to negotiate a ceasefire on U.S. terms; the argument of the article is that although this threat may have worked, it is of little relevance as a guide to the present, when both superpowers have thousands of nuclear weapons.

The most interesting and important article is Robert Jervis' oft-cited "Why Nuclear Superiority Doesn't Matter." Jervis examines the debate between advocates of Assured Destruction (AD) and Flexible Response (FR), and concludes that the latter is unpersuasive, costly, and possibly dangerous. Essentially, Jervis' argument is that the inherent and unavoidable risk of catastrophic escalation in any kind of Soviet-American confrontation serves to effectively deter such confrontations, regardless of relative levels of military "superiority" in any theater or at any weapons level. Since AD does reliably provide "extended deterrence," there is no need to replace it with FR, which requires far more weapons and may be destabilizing. This is familiar territory for those who have followed the strategic debate in recent years, but the excellence of Jervis' writing and analysis nonetheless commends itself.

JEROME SLATER
SUNY, Buffalo

