



**Review: [Untitled]**

Reviewed Work(s):

*Malcolm X: The Assassination.* by Michael Friedly  
David J. Garrow

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involvement, and the hostility of the Nixon administration, which sought to cut its funding and curb its innovative impulses. In addition, the book includes several short vignettes illustrating how local Head Start programs have worked in different parts of the country and concludes with Zigler and coauthor Susan Muenchow's recommendations for improving the program in the future.

Zigler's narrative shows that part of the reason Head Start has survived is that the program successfully cultivated friends in positions of power. In addition, his account emphasizes that, because the federal government mandated parent involvement in the program, Head Start developed a grass-roots constituency that rallied to its defense whenever its existence was threatened. But in the end, according to Zigler, there is more to the story of Head Start's survival than this. Ultimately, he says, Head Start's claim to public support is based on the perception that it is a program that "works."

If everyone today likes Head Start, it is not just because many children are better off because of it. It is also because the program's goals have become considerably more modest over time and because, after a good deal of controversy early in its history, there is now agreement that the program should seek, not to encourage social activism or even to equalize educational achievement, but mainly to instill middle-class values into poor children and their families. Indeed, today the most commonly cited measure of Head Start's success is how well it has educated low-income parents to mainstream standards of behavior and how well it has prepared poor children to conform to the social norms of the schools.

None of this denies Zigler's argument that Head Start is one of the most progressive social programs to come out of the War on Poverty. He is surely right that it embodies the best that liberalism has to offer—most important, that all children deserve an equal start in life, that education involves affective as well as cognitive development, and that parent participation is essential to overcoming the educational obstacles facing poor children. But Zigler does not fully see how the realization of this vision has been compromised by the view that people are poor because they lack middle-class values and can succeed only by acquiring them. This

may have been the price for winning support from middle-class voters and politicians, as Zigler contends, but it has been a costly one for the program to pay.

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*Malcolm X: The Assassination.* By Michael Friedly. (New York: Carroll & Graf, 1992. 238 pp. Cloth, \$18.95, ISBN 0-88184-922-7. Paper, \$10.95, ISBN 0-88184-923-5.)

Malcolm X was shot to death on February 21, 1965, at the Audubon Ballroom in upper Manhattan. The five assassins were members of the Nation of Islam (NOI) Temple No. 25 in Newark. Twenty-three-year-old Talmadge Hayer, who was shot in the leg by one of Malcolm's bodyguards, was the only one arrested at the scene. The others escaped and have never been prosecuted for Malcolm's murder.

Michael Friedly's *Malcolm X: The Assassination*, originally written as an undergraduate thesis at Stanford University, understandably relies heavily upon the 1979 edition of Peter Goldman's *The Death and Life of Malcolm X*, but Friedly adds little information or analysis to that contained in Goldman's landmark book. Friedly's work is well above average for a talented undergraduate, but, needless to say, not every better-than-average undergraduate thesis merits publication as a book. As this reviewer has noted elsewhere, Spike Lee's 1992 companion volume to his film (*By Any Means Necessary: The Trials and Tribulations of the Making of Malcolm X*) surprisingly makes a more valuable contribution to our understanding of Malcolm's murder than do either Friedly's volume or Karl Evanzz's undependable and conspiratorially minded *The Judas Factor* (1992).

Hayer and two NOI members, Thomas Johnson and Norman Butler, who were not involved in Malcolm's killing, were convicted of the crime at a 1966 trial, and while Butler and Johnson have now been paroled from prison, Talmadge Hayer—who fully confessed the true story of the murder in 1977–1978 and identified his actual accomplices—remains in a New York City work-release program.

Little if any doubt remains that Malcolm's assassination was in direct retaliation for his 1964 defection from Elijah Muhammad's NOI and most specifically for his provocative yet correct allegation that Elijah had fathered several out-of-wedlock children. Available evidence does not firmly indicate whether an explicit order for Malcolm's killing came directly from the top of the NOI hierarchy, but, as Friedly correctly observes, "a system of violent retribution . . . was endemic to the Nation of Islam," and "pronouncements in *Muhammad Speaks* . . . did everything short of ordering the Muslim faithful to kill Malcolm X." With the 1993 death of Yusuf Shah, who as "Captain Joseph" was a top New York NOI officer in 1964-1965, chances for resolving ultimate responsibility for the assassination have diminished significantly.

Almost equally important to the question of culpability, however, is the issue of how remiss the FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation) and the New York Police Department's intelligence unit, BOSS (Bureau of Special Services), may have been in ignoring advance indications of Malcolm's murder. Whether or not the FBI had high-level informants within the NOI leadership, the as-yet-unreleased records of the bureau's extensive wiretapping of Elijah may well show whether meaningful signals were missed. Likewise, while at least some portion of BOSS's surveillance file on Malcolm has recently been released, the written reports regularly filed by an undercover BOSS officer who functioned as one of Malcolm's bodyguards have not yet been opened. Michael Friedly's *Malcolm X: The Assassination* does not significantly advance our understanding of Malcolm's killing, but a thorough historical resolution of the crime is very much within our grasp.

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*Campus Wars: The Peace Movement at American State Universities in the Vietnam Era.* By Kenneth J. Heineman. (New York: New York University Press, 1993. xviii, 348 pp. \$40.00, ISBN 0-8147-3490-1.)

Kenneth J. Heineman's *Campus Wars* is a com-

parative study of antiwar activists at Michigan State University, Kent State University, Pennsylvania State University, and the State University of New York at Buffalo. Heineman directs the attention of those interested in the history of the 1960s away from campuses famous for student activism and toward these less well known institutions.

This is an admittedly ambitious undertaking, and at times it becomes a little unwieldy. Heineman uses quantitative data as well as narrative to outline the ways that peace activists operated in their various academic, social, and cultural environments.

As a historian born in the sixties, Heineman wants to break down myths that he feels have developed about the student movement of the 1960s from the writings of and about participant analysts such as Tom Hayden, Todd Gitlin, and James Miller. There are two main themes in *Campus Wars*. The first is that antiwar activists should not be credited with ending the war in Vietnam, but they should be held responsible for creating the conservative backlash among many Americans who supported President Richard M. Nixon's calls for law and order. The second is that the peace movement did not flourish only at elite academic institutions. Rather, Heineman argues, it was most alive on state university campuses where students of varying backgrounds converged, bringing an invigorating mix of philosophies, attitudes, and values to its activities.

*Campus Wars* focuses on divisions within the peace movement itself. Heineman found that activists from working-class families tended to favor strategies involving nonviolent action. Those students often clashed with radical activists from more privileged backgrounds who advocated the use of confrontational tactics and violence within the peace movement. Heineman presents class, ethnic, and racial divisions that existed within Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) and other antiwar and prowar organizations as examples of the widely diverse political scene of the 1960s.

The vision that emerges from this book is of a much more complex and conflicted movement than has previously been described. The antiwar organizations (especially SDS) described on these four different campuses were not "beloved communities." Moreover, none